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The Court's provisions for notice of the charges, opportunity to
call witnesses and to present real evidence, and a written record of the
evidence relied on and reasons for the action taken'0 ' are crucial to
a fair hearing and their importance must not be ignored. The effec-
tiveness of these procedures for insuring fairness, however, is dimin-
ished by the denial of confrontation and cross-examination.
First, although notice is required in part to "enable [the inmate]
to marshal the facts and prepare a defense,""', "[a]bsent confronta-
tion and cross-examination, . . . the party proceeded against is with-
out knowledge of the adverse evidence and cannot, therefore . . .
make his defense."'1 5 Furthermore, without the chance to "challenge
the word of his accusers" 10 6 given by the rights of confrontation and
cross-examination, it will be considerably more difficult for the pris-
oner to "'explain away the accusation' ,'07 since he cannot show
mistake by the other party. Finally, even the most impartial hearing
board cannot fairly judge credibility, nor accurately determine which
version of the disputed facts is true if one side in the contest is not
even questioned.0 8
THOMAS WARREN Ross
Labor Law-Organizational Rights of Managerial Employees
In 1970 the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) abruptly de-
parted from the position it had maintained throughout its history on the
status of managerial employees under the National Labor Relations Act
(NLRA).' Traditionally, the Board had excluded from bargaining
units and from coverage by the Act, all employees whom it identified
as managerial,2 even though these employees were never statutorily ex-
103. 418 U.S. at 581 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
104. Id. at 564.
105. Sands v. Wainwright, 357 F. Supp. 1062, 1087 (M.D. Fla. 1973).
106. 418 U.S. at 582 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
107. Sands v. Wainwright, 357 F. Supp. 1062, 1086 (M.D. Fla. 1973), quoting Es-
coe v. Zerbst, 295 U.S. 490, 493 (1935).
108. 418 U.S. at 582.
1. 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-87 (1970).
2. For a history of the status of managerial employees see NLRB v. Bell Aero-
space Co. Div. of Textron, Inc., 416 U.S. 267, 275-90 (1974).
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eluded by the NLRA.3 For purposes of this exclusion, the Board
labelled as "managerial" any employee who participated in the formula-
tion, determination or effectuation of management policies.4 In 1970,
however, the Board repudiated its former position and in effect
established a presumption that managerial employees were entitled to
bargaining rights under the NLRA unless it could be shown that they
were involved in shaping or implementing labor relations policies for
their employers.5 This new position was shortlived. In NLRB v. Bell
Aerospace Co. Division of Textron, Inc.6 the United States Supreme
Court reinstated the Board's former rule, holding that all employees
properly classified as managerial are excluded from the protections of
the NLRA-not just those in positions susceptible to conflicts of in-
terest in labor relations."
On June 16, 1971, the buyers in the purchasing and procurement
department of a plant operated by Bell Aerospace Company voted in
favor of union representation. Prior to the election the company had
objected to the designation of the buyers as an appropriate bargaining
unit on the grounds that they were managerial employees and thus ex-
cluded from the collective bargaining provisions of the Act.8 The
3. 29 U.S.C. § 152(3) (1970). The Board accomplished this statutory modifica-
tion through the exercise of the discretionary power to determine appropriate bargaining
units which was vested in it by section 9(b) of the Act. Section 9(b) reads in part
as follows: "The Board shall decide in each case whether, in order to assure to employ-
ees the fullest freedom in exercising the rights guaranteed by this Act, the unit appropri-
ate for the purposes of collective bargaining shall be the employer unit, craft unit, plant
unit, or subdivision thereof. . . " 29 U.S.C. § 159(b) (1970).
Managerial employees were not the only class of employees to be denied collective
bargaining rights under this section. Confidential employees, defined in Ford Motor
Co., 66 N.L.R.B. 1317, 1322 (1946) as "those employees who assist and act in a confi-
dential capacity to persons who exercise 'managerial' functions in the field of labor rela-
tions," have also been refused the protection and privileges granted to other workers by
the NLRA. Both classes of employees were excluded from the Act to the same extent
as were the statutorily excluded employees--"all are outside the Act for purposes of the
employee rights accorded by section 7 (including bargaining unit representation) and
denied protection from what otherwise would be unfair labor practices under section 8,
despite the lack of reference to either classification in the language of the NLRA." 26
VANe. L. REV. 850, 853-54 (1973).
4. Ford Motor Co., 66 N.L.R.B. 1317, 1322 (1946).
5. See North Ark. Elec. Cooperative, Inc., 185 N.L.R.B. 550 (1970).
6. 416 U.S. 267 (1974).
7. A second issue resolved in Bell Aerospace, which will not be discussed in this
note, was whether, in order to decide if a certain class of employees, in this case buyers,
were properly classified as managerial, the Board was obligated to employ its section
6 rulemaking powers or whether it could make this determination in an adjudicatory pro-
ceeding. The Court held that not only is resolution of this type of problem in an ad-
judicatory proceeding permitted, but that adjudication is a particularly appropriate
method of making that determination. Id. at 294.
8. Id. at 269. The company argued alternatively that, since the buyers could ne-
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Board, however, held that only those managerial employees who are
involved in formulating and effectuating their employer's labor policies
are excluded from the Act and certified the union as the exclusive bar-
gaining representative of the buyers.9 The company refused to bargain
after the election and the Board, upon finding that the company had
violated sections 8(a)(5) and 8(a)(1) of the Act, issued an order re-
quiring the company to bargain.' 0 The Second Circuit denied enforce-
ment of the order" and the case was brought to the Supreme Court on
appeal by the Board. A sharply divided Supreme Court held that all
managerial employees must be excluded from the coverage of the Act
and that the Board was not free to restrict that traditional exclusion to
only those employees whose union activity might present a conflict of
interest in labor relations.
12
To reach this decision without any explicit statutory basis, the
majority relied first upon the legislative history of the Taft-Hartley
Act.13 To the Court, this history indicated that Congress had intended
to exclude managerial employees from the NLRA even though no ex-
press provision to that effect was included in the Taft-Hartley Act.
Congress apparently believed that explicit exclusion was unnecessary
since the Board's policy at that time was to exclude such employees and
there was no reason to expect this policy to change in the future.'4 The
gotiate prices, select vendors, and commit the company's credit up to $5000, representa-
tion should be denied because of the potential for conflict of interest. The Board re-
jected this claim, noting that the buyers' discretion was limited by guidelines established
by the employer and thus any temptation to use their position to assist the union move-
ment could be effectively curtailed. Id. at 271.
9. See Bell Aerospace Co., 190 N.L.R.B. 431 (1971), reaff'd, 196 N.L.R.B. 827
(1972).
10. 197 N.L.R.B. 209 (1972).
11. 475 F.2d 485 (2d Cir. 1973).
12. 416 U.S. at 289.
13. Ch. 120, 61 Stat. 136 (1947).
14. To substantiate this position the Court pointed to the Conference Committee
Report that specifically stated that provisions of a House bill calling for explicit ex-
clusion from the Act of employees working in labor relations, employment and personnel
departments had been deleted from the final version of the bill because Congress be-
lieved that the Board would continue its de facto exclusion of these employees without
specific legislation. Id. at 282. The majority also pointed to excerpts from the legisla-
tive history of the Act that indicated congressional concern that bargaining rights should
not be extended to corporate executives.
In discussing the status of confidential employees, the House noted that "[m]ost
of the people who would qualify as 'confidential employees' are executives and are ex-
cluded from the Act in any event." H.R. REP. No. 245, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 23
(1947). Finally, the majority relied on language in the Senate Report and on comments
made during congressional debates that indicated congressional concern that, if super-
visory employees were granted bargaining rights under the Act, the same reasoning could
be used to extend these rights to "corporate vice-presidents and other executives who
were part of management." 416 U.S. at 284 n.13.
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Court also noted that, in passing the Taft-Hartley Act, Congress was
concerned with the welfare of the common worker and not with those
representing the employer's interests. Accordingly, Congress sought
to maintain a distinct division between management and labor to assure
that employers would have loyal representatives within the company
and that "bosses" would not be allowed in positions that would enable
them to dominate or cause them to be dominated by the rank-and-file
workers."5 From rather sketchy passages in the legislative history of
the Taft-Hartley Act the majority reasoned that, since Congress may
have intended to exclude certain managerial employees, all other em-
ployees traditionally classified as managerial should likewise be con-
sidered as outside of the Act even though they were never mentioned
in the congressional debates or reports. The majority also relied
heavily upon congressional failure to enact legislation either in 194710
or 19591" explicitly including managerial employees within the scope
of the Act in light of the Board's prior holdings that they were
excluded.
1 8
The dissent, on the other hand, agreed with the Board's new posi-
tion that only those managerial employees who shape and implement
the employer's labor policies should be denied the right to organize un-
der the NLRA. They argued that only the organization of this nar-
rower group of workers would upset the delicate balance of power in
the collective bargaining process that Congress had intended to main-
tain.
1 9
Although the Supreme Court majority in Bell Aerospace pre-
sented a feasible argument that Congress in 1947 contemplated the ex-
15. 416 U.S. at 281-82.
16. The NLRA was amended in 1947 by the Taft-Hartley Act, ch. 120, 61 Stat.
136 (1947).
17. The NLRA was further amended in 1959 by the Landrum-Griffin Act, Pub.
L. No. 86-257, 73 Stat. 519 (1959).
18. After reviewing the Board's decisions in this area, the Court concluded that,
although prior to 1947 the Board had never stated that managerial employees could not
be accorded bargaining rights under the Act, it had nonetheless never permitted them
to be included in bargaining units of rank-and-file workers and had never certified a bar-
gaining unit comprised exclusively of managerial employees. 416 U.S. at 276. The
Court also noted that after 1947 the Board did expressly adopt the position that mana-
gerial employees were beyond the scope of the Act and consistently maintained this posi-
tion until 1970. Id. at 289. The majority then argued that congressional failure to
modify the Board's holding or to change the Board's definition of "managerial employee"
was persuasive evidence that that agency's interpretation of the statute was the one in-
tended by Congress. id. at 275.
19. Id. at 308. The dissent based its decision on the lack of any specific language
in either the statute or the legislative history of the Act addressed to the status of man-
agerial employees. Id. at 297.
[Vol. 53
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clusion of managerial employees as well as supervisory employees from
the Act, the dissent presented an equally persuasive argument that
Congress did not intend such a broad exclusion. Confronted with such
ambiguity, perhaps a better approach to the issue would have been to
examine it in light of the policies that underlie the NLRA and the eco-
nomic realities of current industrial organization.
The congressional concerns outlined in the majority's decision
were based on industrial organization as it existed in 1947. Employ-
ment patterns, however, have changed drastically since that time with
a larger percentage of workers now entering the lower levels of man-
agement. 20  As the number of these managerial employees has in-
creased, so may have the bureaucratization and concomitant disaffec-
tion with higher management that usually accompanies such an in-
crease. As a result, the traditional alignment with the employer that
the Board had in the past attributed to managerial employees21 may
have been severed. If these employees have lost or subsequently lose
their attachments to their employers and find that their demands are
not being satisfied, they may, despite the Supreme Court's ruling in Bell
Aerospace, organize and bargain outside of the Act. Their constitu-
tional right to do so has been established. 2  The result might be the
type of economic warfare that the Act was designed to avoid. 3
20. Statistics presented in the United States Bureau of the Census Reports show
for example that, while only 0.09% of the labor force were classified as personnel and
labor relations workers in 1950, 0.15% were so classified in 1960 and 0.38% in 1970.
Likewise, in 1950 only 0.059% of the labor force were classified as credit personnel
whereas the 1960 figure was 0.070% and the 1970 figure was 0.080%. This trend is
also reflected in the percentages of workers employed as purchasing agents and buyers
(other than retail buyers): 0.11% in 1950; 0.15% in 1960; and 0.21% in 1970. See
U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. CENSUS OF POPULATION: 1970, SUBJECT REPORTS,
OCCUPATIONAL CHARACTERISTICS (Final Rep. 1973); U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S.
CENSUS OF POPULATION: 1960, SUBJECT REPORTS, OCCUPATIONAL CHARACTERISTICS,
table 1, at 2-3 (Final Rep. 1963); U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. CENSUS OF POPU-
LATIoN: 1950, EMPLOYMENT AND PERSONAL CHARACTERIsTiCs, table 1, at 1B 15-16,
(Spec. Reports, pt. 1, ch. A, 1953).
21. Retail Clerks Int'l Ass'n v. NLRB, 366 F.2d 642 (D.C. Cir. 1966); Sunnyland
Packing Co., 113 N.L.R.B. 162 (1955); Palace Laundry Dry Cleaning Corp., 75
N.L.R.B. 320 (1947).
22. See Texas & N.O.R.R. v. Brotherhood of Ry. & S.S. Clerks, 281 U.S. 548,
570 (1930); Gompers v. Bucks Stove & Range Co., 221 U.S. 418, 439 (1911). Al-
though the collective bargaining provisions and unfair labor practice protections of the
Act lend enormous strength to a union movement, they are not always essential.
23. Section 1 of the Act expresses its policy:
The denial by some employers of the right of employees to organize and
the refusal by some employers to accept the procedure of collective bargaining
lead to strikes and other forms of industrial strife or unrest, which have the
intent or the necessary effect of burdening or obstructing commerce. ...
Experience has proved that protection by law of the right of employees
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Neither the Board nor the Court could then regulate this activity since
the regulatory mechanisms of the Act are not applicable to employees
not covered by it. The result could be detrimental to the interests of
both employers and employees.
The Supreme Court's decision to exclude all managerial employ-
ees from the collective bargaining process provided by the Act also ig-
nores the fact that, although these employees may be more closely
aligned to management than to rank-and-file workers with respect to
their job responsibilities, they share with all other employees the desire
for job security, periodic wage increases, and other economic benefits
that the employer might not provide absent organized economic pres-
sure. Although in the past managerial employees could probably ex-
pect to achieve such benefits by performing their jobs well, a substantial
increase in the number of managerial employees might have reduced
the possibility that outstanding work will be noticed and rewarded.
While there are legitimate policies favoring unions of managerial
employees, there are also legitimate objections. The Board has long
recognized that the most serious of these objections is the potential con-
flict of interest24 that might destroy the delicate balance of power be-
tween labor and management that the Act seeks to assure. Examples
of the potential dangers to employers claimed to be inherent in such
a split of allegiance include the possibilities: (1) that managerial em-
ployees who are unionized might show favoritism to union-organized
companies when accepting bids or making purchases; (2) that the em-
ployees will guard the interests of their sister unions in the company
when making recommendations of management policies or when
executing these policies; and (3) that managerial employees may fur-
ther disrupt the conduct of their employer's business by engaging in
sympathy strikes or other economic measures to assist sister unions in
their bargaining struggle with the employer in exchange for similar as-
to organize and bargain collectively safeguards commerce from injury, impair-
ment, or interruption, and promotes the flow of commerce by removing cer-
tain recognized sources of industrial strife and unrest ....
It is declared to be the policy of the United States to eliminate the causes
of certain substantial obstructions to the free flow of commerce . . . by en-
couraging the practice and procedure of collective bargaining and by protecting
the exercise by workers of full freedom of association, self-organization, and
designation of representatives of their own choosing, for the purpose of nego-
tiating the terms and conditions of their employment or other mutual aid and
protection.
29 U.S.C. § 151 (1970).
24. The conflict is between the employee as a union member and the employee as
a representative of management.
[Vol. 53
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sistance when the managerial employees bargain.
Such concerns, however, are perhaps unfounded since the em-
ployer has the capacity to control possible inclinations toward favoritism
by discharging employees if their unprotected activities cause injury to
the business and by establishing strict guidelines to which these employ-
ees must conform when making managerial decisions. However, the
employer may argue in response that after-the-fact discharge does not
remedy a fait accompli breach of trust and that in certain instances,
broad discretion is precisely what is required of an employee's position.
Thus forcing the employee to adhere to strict guidelines would partially
destroy his usefulness to the employer.
As a result of Bell Aerospace the types of employees to whom
the Act's protections will not be available will be determined by the
criteria established by the Board for defining managerial employees
prior to 1970. Corporate officers and employees who work in labor
relations25 have always been held to be managerial as have employees
who have actual responsibility for hiring or firing or who may effectively
recommend such action.20 Other employees have been found to be
managerial if the evidence showed that they participated in making or
implementing the employer's management policies27 or had "discretion,
independent of the employer's established policy, in the performance
of [their] duties. 28  Using this formula, the Board has fairly consist-
ently labelled the following positions managerial: buyers,2 9 credit de-
25. See American Broadcasting Co., 107 N.L.R.B. 74, 79 (1953) (employee whose
responsibilities included formulating the employer's interpretation of collective bargain-
ing contract clauses held managerial).
26. Bonwit Teller, Inc., 84 N.L.R.B. 414, 422 (1949).
27. To be classified as an employee who formulates or implements the employer's
management policies, the employee must be in a position to make decisions that will
definitely influence that policy. The fact that he may recommend policy decisions does
not alone establish his managerial status. Nor does "mere participation in conferences
of supervisory personnel, from which emerge some decisions, based in part upon his rec-
ommendations . . . ." Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 97 N.L.R.B. 1271, 1272 (1952). See
Illinois State Journal-Register, Inc. v. NLRB, 412 F.2d 37, 41 (7th Cir. 1969); Westing-
house Elec. Corp., 122 N.L.R.B. 391, 392-93 (1958); Puget Sound Power & Light Co.,
117 N.L.R.B. 1825, 1827 (1957). See also Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 113 N.L.R.B. 337,
340 (1955).
28. Illinois State Journal-Register, Inc. v. NLRB, 412 F.2d 37, 41 (7th Cir. 1969);
Eastern Camera & Photo Corp., 140 N.L.R.B. 569 (1963). "TIThe Board does not con-
sider the performance of duties requiring the exercise of judgment to be an indication
of managerial status per se, nor do the lack of close supervision and freedom to exercise
considerable discretion render an employee managerial where his decisions must conform
to the employer's established policy." Albert Lea Cooperative Creamery Ass'n, 119
N.L.R.B. 817, 822-23 (1957); see American Broadcasting C., 107 N.L.R.B. 74, 79
(1953); Northwestern Bell Tel. Co., 79 N.L.R.B. 549, 554-55 (1948).
29. Swift & Co., 115 N.L.R.B. 752, 753 (1956); see Curtiss-Wright Corp., 103
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partment personnel, 30 expediters,"' and employees who establish the
company's price lists.3 2
Had the Board's new test been affirmed by the court, labor rela-
tions personnel would of course have been excluded. The dissent also
suggested that, if corporate officers were not reached because of their
responsibilities for labor relations, they could probably be excluded as
supervisory. 3 In addition, although neither the Board nor the dissent
in Bell Aerospace defined the scope of the category "employees who
shape or implement the employer's labor relations policies," it is likely
that such a category would include upper-level employees in the em-
ployment and personnel departments. Thus the principal categories of
employees who would be excluded from the Act under the majority's
test but included under the Board's test are buyers, some credit depart-
ment personnel, expediters, and employees who set prices for goods
manufactured by the company.
Having established whose right to organize under the Act is
actually at issue, one may then determine whether the Supreme Court
or the Labor Board adopted the better position. To make this deter-
mination it is necessary to balance the employer's right to have loyal
employees to assist him in making and executing his management
policies against the strong public policy of promoting peaceful settle-
ments of labor disputes and the employees' interest in achieving a bar-
gaining position sufficient to insure their effective participation in their
economic future. Would permitting these employees to organize in
N.L.R.B. 458, 464 (1953); Electric Controller & Mfg. Co., 69 N.L.R.B. 1242, 1246
(1946); Barrett Div., Allied Chem. & Dye Corp., 65 N.L.R.B. 903, 905 (1946); Hudson
Motor Car Co., 55 N.L.R.B. 509, 512 (1944). The Board has also excluded as man-
agerial a buyer who, though limited to placing orders with an approved list of vendors,
could use his discretion as to which vendor would receive the order. Titeflex, Inc., 103
N.L.R.B. 223, 225-26 (1953).
30. Charles Livingston & Sons, Inc., 86 N.L.R.B. 30, 33-34 (1949). Contra,
Franklin's Stores Corp., 117 N.L.R.B. 793, 794-95 (1957). If the amount of credit and
the standards for extending credit are so limited as to make the determinations routine,
the employee will not be held to be managerial. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 100 N.L.R.B.
90, 91 (1952).
31. Spicer Mfg. Corp., 55 N.L.R.B. 1491, 1498 (1944). But see Barrett Div., Al-
lied Chem. & Dye Corp., 65 N.L.R.B. 903, 907 (1946).
32. Electric Controller & Mfg. Co., 69 N.L.R.B. 1242, 1245 (1946) . The Board
has refused to recognized similar positions as managerial. American Fed. of Labor, 120
N.L.R.B. 969 (1958) (employees with remote connection with top management); Tite-
flex, Inc., 103 N.L.R.B. 223, 224 (1953) (sales representatives); Transit Cas. Co., 83
N.L.R.B. 857, 859 (1949) (insurance adjusters); Lumberman's Mut. Cas. Co., 75
N.L.R.B. 1132, 1126 (1948) (sales representatives).
33. 416 U.S. at 307 n.3.
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bargaining units separate from those of the rank-and-file workers 34 so
hinder the employer in operating his business and place him at such
disadvantage at the bargaining table that the employees should be de-
nied the right to organize by judicial decree even though the NLRA
has never explicitly denied them that right? The answer to this ques-
tion is at best a matter of opinion. However, it was precisely for decid-
ing this type of question that Congress established a special agency that,
through its constant contact with industry and the problems of interpret-
ing the labor statutes, could develop the expertise needed to resolve
these issues.35 Nevertheless, the Board's response has been rejected
and the responsibility for providing these employees the protection of
the NLRA lies now with Congress.
SHIRLEY J. WELLS
Public Utilities-State Action and Informal Due Process After
Jackson
For nearly a century those who would impose constitutional limita-
tions on ostensibly private conduct have been grappling with the elusive
concept of "state action."' Indeed, the problem of defining state ac-
tion in the troublesome no man's land between purely private and
purely governmental conduct has been called the most important prob-
lem in American law.2 In Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co.3 -the
United States Supreme Court found the essential state -action require-
ment lacking in a customer's attempt to impose due process limitations
on the termination procedure of a privately owned utility company.4
34. Separate units for guards and professional employees have been authorized
since 1947. 29 U.S.C. § 159(b) (1970).
35. See NLRB v. Hearst Publications, Inc., 322 U.S. 111, 130 (1944).
1. In the Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 11 (1883) the United States Supreme
Court first propounded the essential dichotomy between state action, which is subject
to constitutional restraints, and "individual invasion of individual rights," which is not.
The distinction for fourteenth amendment purposes is based on the proscription that
"[n]o State shall make or enforce any law. . . ." U.S. CoNST. amend. XIV, § 1.
2. See Black, Foreword: "State Action," Equal Protection, and California's Propo-
sition 14, 81 HAIv. L. REv. 69 (1967).
3. 95 S. Ct. 449 (1974).
4. Lower courts had been sharply divided in applying the state action doctrine to
utilities which were privately owned, but subject to extensive and detailed regulation by
the state. Compare Palmer v. Columbia Gas, Inc., 479 F.2d 153 (6th Cir. 1973); Ihrke
1975]
